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PROFESSIONALIZING MORAL ENGAGEMENT (A 
RESPONSE TO MICHAEL HATFIELD) 
Robert K. Vischer 
In Professionalizing Moral Deference, Michael Hatfield argues that the 
way we form lawyers ―begins with moral desensitization,‖ a technique that 
teaches future lawyers ―to override [their] moral intuition.‖1  In making his 
case, Hatfield offers the infamous torture memos as Exhibit A, but they 
may not be the best vehicle for proving his thesis. As the work of John Yoo 
shows, some of the most scandalously deficient legal advice may stem (at 
least in part) from the lawyer‘s inability or unwillingness to override his 
moral intuition.  There is no reason to believe, however, that Yoo‘s moral 
intuition would have led him to reject the conclusions set forth in the me-
mos, and there is some evidence that his moral intuition helped shape his 
analysis.  Seen in this light, the memos could be construed—in direct oppo-
sition to Hatfield‘s characterization—as evidence that law schools need to 
redouble their efforts to train lawyers to override their moral intuition.  But 
this reaction would miss the partial truth underlying Hatfield‘s analysis.  
The torture memos do underscore a desensitizing that afflicts many lawyers, 
though its implications are broader—and perhaps less insurmountable—
than Hatfield describes.  Although he is undoubtedly correct that lawyers 
should ―stop telling [one another] that overcoming personal moral squea-
mishness is the great call of the law,‖2 the law‘s call is a bit more nuanced: 
although lawyers should not ignore their own moral squeamishness, neither 
should they wallow in it.  The lawyer‘s cognizance of her own moral intui-
tion should mark the beginning, not the end, of her inquiry into the moral 
dimension of the representation. 
I. WHY (AND HOW) A LAWYER‘S MORAL INTUITION MATTERS 
Lawyers need to take stock of their own moral intuition in order to help 
clients unpack the moral dimension of what is at stake in the case.  Occa-
sionally, the case or client may require the lawyer to facilitate conduct that 
the lawyer cannot, in good conscience, facilitate; under such circumstances, 
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ted is not the same as asserting, as Hatfield does, that ―[i]f I would not fo-
reclose on a particular orphanage, I should not be encouraged to help 
one else to foreclose upon it.  If I would not drown a man to make him talk, 
I should not be encouraged to help someone else to do it.‖4  If Hatfield 
means that professional norms should not pressure a lawyer to ignore her 
conscience in her decisionmaking, then I wholeheartedly agree.  But if he 
means that professional norms should embody a presumption that a law-
yer‘s own moral convictions will shape her personal decisionmaking and 
professional decisionmaking in identical ways, then he is misconstruing the 
moral dimension of the lawyer-client relationship.   
Assume that if I held the mortgage on an orphanage, I would not forec-
lose on it.  But as a lawyer, after (an inescapably moral) dialogue with my 
client who holds such a mortgage, perhaps I can understand and respect his 
reasons for foreclosing—even if I would choose not to foreclose if I were in 
his position.  My decision to assist in the foreclosure does not reflect moral 
desensitizing or a willingness to override my own moral intuition.  Rather, 
it reflects the fact that I am, as a lawyer, a partner in a moral dialogue; I am 
not a moral arbiter.  My participation in those dialogues may need to begin 
with a cognizance and articulation of my moral intuition (or squeamish-
ness), but it need not end there. 
The problem with the torture memos—and I‘ll focus on the August 
2002 memo, as Hatfield does—is not that John Yoo overcame his own 
moral squeamishness about torture; the problem, more likely, is that he re-
fused to even acknowledge his own moral squeamishness (and contrary to 
what Hatfield suggests, it seems that Yoo was squeamish about prohibiting 
torture in the wake of 9/11).  The torture memo is so egregious because it 
reflects professional failure on both legal and moral fronts: Yoo‘s shoddy 
legal analysis, it seems, was shaped by his moral intuition, but the apparent 
lack of moral engagement between Yoo and the White House kept that 
moral intuition beneath the surface of his representation.  The governing 
statute provides that pain or suffering must be ―severe‖ to constitute torture, 
but does not define the term.5  In his August 2002 memo, based on the dic-
tionary definition, Yoo concluded that ―the adjective ‗severe‘ conveys that 
the pain or suffering [of the subject] must be of such a high level of intensi-
ty that the pain is difficult for the subject to endure.‖6  Logically, this would 
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formation because he is unable to endure the pain is the whole point of tor-
ture.   
This is the point where Yoo‘s own ―moral intuition‖ may have kicked 
in, compromising the quality of his legal analysis in the process.  Apparent-
ly, to equate torture with the infliction of pain that is difficult to endure 
would, from Yoo‘s perspective (or from Yoo‘s morally laden embrace of 
the White House‘s perspective), have ruled out too many interrogation 
techniques.  He therefore decided to look to the use of the term ―‗severe 
pain‘ . . . in statutes defining an emergency medical condition for the pur-
pose of providing health benefits.‖7  The statutory language defines an 
emergency condition as one:  
 
[M]anifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severi-
ty (including severe pain) such that a prudent lay person, 
who possesses an average knowledge of health and medi-
cine, could reasonably expect the absence of immediate 
medical attention to result in—placing the health of the in-
dividual . . . (i) in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious impairment 
to bodily functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of any bodi-
ly organ or part.8  
 
The statute provides that severe pain is one type of symptom that might 
lead a person to believe that another‘s health is in serious jeopardy, that her 
bodily functions are seriously impaired, or that an organ is seriously dys-
functional.  The language of the emergency health benefit statute implies 
that other symptoms might also lead a person to such beliefs.  Nevertheless, 
Yoo concludes that severe pain, for purposes of the unrelated torture statute, 
should be equated with the level of pain associated with the three emergen-
cy health conditions: ―death, organ failure, or serious impairment of body 
functions . . . .‖9 
The possibility that Yoo may have been unwilling or unable to override 
his own moral intuition in crafting his memo is highlighted by one morally 
charged assertion he makes in the memo‘s concluding section.  On the as-
sumption that the torture statute could apply to the interrogation of sus-
pected al Qaeda members, Yoo explores the availability of the necessity 
defense, noting that it ―can justify the intentional killing of one person to 
save two others.‖10  He then asserts: ―Clearly, any harm that might occur 
during an interrogation would pale to insignificance compared to the harm 
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thousands of lives.‖11  Analyzing the availability of the necessity defense 
does not lead inexorably to the unabashedly utilitarian conclusion that any 
possible harm that might be inflicted on an individual in order to extract in-
formation that could avert a terrorist attack is ―insignificant.‖  A similarly 
utilitarian theme can be discerned in some of Yoo‘s comments to the me-
dia,12 further exemplifying that Yoo‘s own moral intuition appears to have 
informed his conclusions about the interrogation techniques. 
Hatfield believes that lawyers such as Yoo ―began with the objective of 
justifying torture,‖ given that ―[w]hoever was ultimately responsible for re-
questing the torture memo apparently had such an objective, and the law-
yers, apparently, accepted that position as a morally acceptable starting 
point.‖ 13  As such, Yoo‘s ―bad legal reasoning‖ was driven by ―a bad moral 
conclusion.‖14  But whether Yoo personally believed in the moral accepta-
bility of torture, or whether he simply believed in the moral acceptability of 
deferring to the White House‘s belief in the moral acceptability of torture, 
he could not erase the underlying moral dimension of his legal analysis, 
even if he did his best to avoid acknowledging it. 
Still, the question remains: what would have happened if Yoo ac-
knowledged the moral dimension of the legal question he faced?  If Hatfield 
means to suggest that Yoo‘s moral intuition, if operative, would have inva-
riably led to the rejection of torture as immoral, Hatfield is taking us into 
fairly heady epistemological waters.  After all, even in the wake of the re-
cent disclosures about waterboarding, a majority of Americans believe that 
the use of harsh interrogation techniques against suspected terrorists is justi-
fied.15 Relying on the moral intuitions of lawyers may be no more reliable 
for getting to Hatfield‘s preferred moral outcomes than relying on the moral 
intuitions of Americans in general.  Simply unleashing the lawyer‘s con-
science from the constraints of professional deference may not solve the 
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II. THE GOOD OF MORAL DEFERENCE 
Hatfield argues that lawyers are professionalized into accepting ―the 
moral good of moral deference.‖16  Pinning the blame on moral deference, 
though, creates the impression that lawyers carry around a fixed set of mor-
al convictions and that their only moral responsibility in dealing with clients 
is to determine whether the client‘s objectives align with those convictions.  
According to Hatfield, lawyers fail to fulfill even this singular obligation.  
They no longer formulate a set of moral convictions—they simply adopt (or 
defer to) the convictions of their clients.  Thus, the same moral deference 
that leads the lawyer to help her client foreclose on the orphanage spawns 
the torture memo. 
I agree that lawyers should think about their moral convictions.  I have 
turned down a case on moral grounds, and I do not believe that lawyers 
should leave their consciences at the office door.17  But while I agree with 
Hatfield that a lawyer‘s moral intuition is professionally relevant, we disag-
ree about the implications of that relevance.  Presuming that my moral 
views should always be in harmony with my client‘s objectives (and that 
deference to my client‘s objectives implies that I have compromised my 
moral beliefs) gives an overly simplistic view of the lawyer-client relation-
ship, thereby obfuscating the deeper failures of lawyers‘ professional for-
mation.  Moral deference is not the problem.  The problem is moral 
disengagement, by which I mean the tendency of lawyers to disclaim any 
responsibility for the moral dimension of the representation.  Lawyers insist 
on moral deference because they mistakenly believe that it is the only alter-
native to moral paternalism, and moral paternalism is exactly what critics 
will accuse Hatfield of embracing.   
For example, Hatfield writes that we might avoid creating lawyers 
willing to ―sign off on torture if legal education did not begin with dis-
integrating the skills for intellectual agility from the skills for moral resolu-
tion.‖18  But we do not need lawyers to reach ―moral resolution.‖  It is not 
the lawyer‘s job to resolve the moral questions that clients face.  To do so 
infringes on client autonomy, particularly if clients are not empowered to 
participate in the resolution.  We do need lawyers, on the other hand, to en-
sure that clients are aware of the moral questions that are often embedded in 
the legal questions raised by the representation.  Lawyers‘ recurrent failure 
to raise moral questions infringes on client autonomy by precluding the 
client‘s ability to fully consider what is at stake in the case.  Our approach 
to professional formation—both during and after law school—almost total-
ly ignores this ―moral due diligence‖ dimension of the attorney-client rela-
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lawyers need to be able to engage their clients in a moral dialogue, which 
requires both familiarity with, and sensitivity to, moral reasoning.  But law-
yers‘ capabilities in this regard should not be deployed in order to resolve 
the moral questions; rather, they should be deployed in order to assist the 
client in resolving the moral questions.  It is not only the lawyer‘s con-
science, after all, that is at stake during the representation.  Moral engage-
ment brings the full stakes of the representation into relief. 
III. THE GOOD OF MORAL ENGAGEMENT 
If, as Hatfield argues, cultivated moral deference allows lawyers to let 
themselves off the hook, then I would add that cultivated moral disengage-
ment allows lawyers to let their clients off the hook also.  Lawyers can help 
bring their clients‘ consciences into play on a matter by bringing the moral 
dimension of the representation to the surface.  Although this observation 
may strike non-lawyers as obvious, it unfortunately runs counter to some 
mainstream interpretations of the lawyer‘s role. 
For example, Stephen Pepper has famously compared a lawyer‘s client 
to ―someone who stands frustrated before a photocopier that won‘t copy,‖ 
and who needs ―a technician . . . to make it go.‖19  The technician is ordina-
rily not concerned with ―whether the content of what is about to be copied 
is morally good or bad.‖20  At one level, Pepper‘s analogy tells us some-
thing important about what it is lawyers do: lawyers provide citizens with 
access to a machine that they would not know how to work on their own.  
Hatfield‘s implicit suggestion (that lawyers should represent only those 
clients whose legal objectives align comfortably with their own moral 
claims) seems to switch the lawyer‘s role from expert facilitator to moral 
arbiter.  Just as we do not want the photocopier technician telling us that he 
will only fix our machine if we promise not to use it to copy pornography or 
radical political literature, we do not want the lawyer to restrict his clients‘ 
legally available options based on the lawyer‘s own moral convictions. 
The legal profession rightfully would be concerned about access to law 
if the lawyer‘s conscience were to operate as a trump card.  But the polar 
opposite view—the one that sees lawyers as photocopier technicians—is 
equally problematic.  The law does not function like a photocopier.  When I 
copy something, I know exactly what I am putting in, and I know exactly 
what I get back, even if I do not understand everything that happens in be-
tween.  By contrast, clients often will not recognize, much less understand, 
the inputs and outputs of the law ―machine.‖  In terms of ―input,‖ the ma-
chine does not simply apply black-letter law to the client‘s stated objective.  
Moral considerations—among other external norms—are part of the equa-
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yer‘s perception of the client‘s (often unstated) moral perspective, or the 
lawyer‘s application of the profession‘s moral perspective.21  Further, the 
―output‖ is not an exact reproduction of the input; pursuing the client‘s ob-
jectives may have consequences beyond the attainment of that objective.  
Those consequences—the collateral effects on the client‘s public standing 
or moral integrity, harms to the opposing party or third parties, damage to 
the reputations of the lawyer or her colleagues—may not be readily appar-
ent to the client.  It is not difficult to appreciate what one has wrought with 
the use of a copy machine; the same cannot be said for one‘s use of the law.  
The lawyer is not simply a technician, nor is she a moral arbiter.  As legal 
advisors, lawyers are partners in a dialogue that brims with moral signific-
ance, whether or not they choose to acknowledge it.   
The profession tends to view both the lawyer and the client as bearers 
of fixed sets of moral convictions.  As Tom Shaffer puts it, the profession‘s 
assumption ―is that the lawyer and client both operate in moral worlds but 
that their worlds are isolated from one another.‖22  The resulting inclination 
is to equate moral dialogue with a paternalistic power play by the overbear-
ing lawyer.  The profession would be better served by acknowledging that 
both the lawyer and client are moral agents, capable of meaningful moral 
reflection.  Might the torture memos have looked different if the profession 
were to recognize that the ―[l]awyer and client depend on one another and 
influence one another,‖ and that this ―moral interdependence is the basis of 
[their] conversation?‖23  By articulating the moral dimension of his analysis, 
Yoo could have cued the administration that his legal reasoning was a func-
tion, in part, of his (or his perception of the administration‘s) utilitarian 
moral premise, rather than a straightforward explication of settled law.  At a 
minimum, Yoo would have forced the administration to face the content of 
the moral claims embodied in its policies. 
IV. WHAT DOES MORAL ENGAGEMENT LOOK LIKE (AND NOT LOOK 
LIKE)? 
Recognizing the moral dimension of the representation is one thing; 
facilitating a conversation about the moral dimension is another.  This is 
where Hatfield‘s indictment rings (partially) true, for our professional for-
mation desensitizes lawyers to questions of moral judgment primarily by 
ignoring those questions.  Hatfield asserts that ―lawyers are professiona-
lized in a manner that undermines moral reasoning skills‖ because lawyers 
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stakes issues.‖24  Moral avoidance is not unique to lawyers, of course, and 
Hatfield walks through history to demonstrate that the human tendency to 
do something we believe may be wrong because someone else tells us it is 
okay is a ―perennial evil.‖25  This tendency ―seems to be a recurring tempta-
tion for everyone,‖ and one for which ―there is no effective cure.‖26   
But what if the problematic tendency is not, as Hatfield suggests, the 
lawyer‘s willingness to follow the client‘s orders?  What if the problem is 
the lawyer‘s failure to help the client reflect meaningfully on the moral 
premises and implications of those orders?  The client‘s tendency to equate 
legality with moral permissibility is made possible by the opacity and mal-
leability of legal advice.  Clients can avoid difficult moral questions by al-
lowing lawyers‘ legal advice to cloud, and occasionally block altogether, 
the moral inquiry at the heart of a legal matter.  Using lawyers to finesse the 
stark moral reality of torture is not, after all, a technique that was invented 
by the Bush administration.27  Lawyers can use their analytical tools to con-
ceal the law as adeptly as they may use them to clarify its purposes.  This is 
especially true when professional norms remove an entire category of con-
siderations from the attorney-client conversation.   
In this regard, moral engagement honors the client‘s dignity by ac-
knowledging her moral agency.  Presuming that a client is unsuited for (or 
uninterested in) a moral dialogue regarding the representation treats the 
client as a caricature, as a set of legal objectives unconnected to a broader 
worldview or deeper set of values.  If the lawyer and client engage each 
other as moral subjects, they act in recognition of the relational quality of 
human dignity.  It is not about the lawyer working to bring the client into 
conformity with some free-floating moral principles, or, worse yet, into 
conformity with the lawyer‘s own moral convictions.  Morally engaged la-
wyering should assist the client in exploring her own moral accountability 
to others affected by the representation.   
Philosopher Stephen Darwall identifies and emphasizes this special re-
lationship as the ―second personal‖ nature of moral obligation.28  He be-
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―responsible to‖ another moral agent to whom the actor relates.  Moral re-
sponsibility ―concerns how, in light of what someone has done, she is to be 
related to, that is, regarded and addressed (including by herself) within the 
second-personal relationships we stand in as members of the moral com-
munity.‖29  Refusing to account for the client‘s moral accountability dimi-
nishes the client‘s standing as an agent within the moral community.  Still, 
while moral engagement will enhance the client‘s accountability for her de-
cisions, the engagement should not be divisive or privilege the lawyer‘s 
moral claims over the client‘s.  Neglecting the need for moral engagement 
compromises the lawyer‘s commitment to the common good, and we 
should not presume that the client herself rejects such commitments.   
Our acknowledgment of moral pluralism should not obscure the fact 
that lawyers and their clients often share a belief in certain fundamental 
moral values.  The problem is that the lawyer‘s silence allows the client to 
avoid seeing the relationship between those commonly held moral beliefs 
and the legally permissible options.  As David Luban puts it, ―cases of . . . 
intense moral disagreement are rarer than a different sort of case: one in 
which the moralistic lawyer and the client largely agree in their moral val-
ues but differ because the client simply doesn‘t want scruples to get in the 
way of a favorable outcome.‖30  In the many cases ―where the client‘s deci-
sion results from cognitive distortion rather than a genuinely different moral 
code, moral acquiescence on the lawyer‘s part will reinforce the distortion, 
while moral activism may break the spell and reveal that the moral codes of 
the lawyer and the client [are] not so different after all.‖31  The lawyer‘s 
moral claims should not drive the representation, but that does not mean 
that the profession should not care about the lawyer‘s own moral develop-
ment.  The lawyer‘s counseling function depends on her ability to under-
stand the client‘s moral reasoning.32  In the case of the torture memo, John 
Yoo compounded the failure of his skewed legal analysis by failing to force 
the White House to face the moral implications of ―aggressive‖ interroga-
tion practices.  In combination, these failures took Yoo out of the roles of 
advocate or advisor and into the role of ―absolver.‖  Luban explains:  
 
Giving the client skewed advice because the client wants it 
is a different role than either advocate or advisor.  One 
might call it the Lawyers As Absolver, or, less nicely, the 
Lawyer As Indulgence Seller. . . .  The important thing to 
notice is that the role of Absolver, unlike the roles of Ad-
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troom, the adversary is supposed to check the advocate‘s 
excesses.  In the lawyer‘s office, [while] advising the client, 
the lawyer is supposed to check the client‘s excesses. . . .  
Conflating the two roles moves the lawyer out of the li-
mited role-based immunity that advocates enjoy . . . into 
the world of indulgence seller.33 
 
The lawyer-as-absolver is not a deliberate or conscious creation of the 
legal profession or of the individual lawyer.  But it is a role made possible 
by the profession‘s failure to take the moral dimension of legal advice se-
riously.  Nothing prevents a lawyer from cultivating moral dialogues with 
her clients as she deems appropriate.  But given the profession‘s longstand-
ing cultivation of moral disengagement among lawyers, systematic attention 
to the problem is in order.34   
V. FORMING THE MORALLY ENGAGED LAWYER 
The most obvious institutional venue for reversing—or at least mitigat-
ing—lawyers‘ inclination toward moral disengagement is law school.  Jo-
seph Singer notes that ―the ability to make sophisticated arguments about 
justice and morality is a basic skill all lawyers need.‖35  And yet, in his 
classes at Harvard Law School, he finds it sorely lacking: 
 
[W]hen I ask my students to make or defend arguments 
based on considerations of rights, fairness, justice, morali-
ty, or the fundamental values underlying a free and demo-
cratic society, they are mute.  They get out the first 
sentence: ―I have a right to use my property as I see fit‖ or 
―I have a right to be left alone.‖  But then they go silent; 
they do not have a second sentence—they do not know how 
to go on.  Their silence is partly caused by their not know-
ing what to say; they cannot figure out what vocabulary to 
use or how to make the argument.  But the underlying rea-
son for this uncertainty is their fear that such arguments are 
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More than thirty years ago, Roger Cramton identified one contributing 
cause of this phenomenon by noting the pervasive disregard of values in the 
law school classroom.  He observed that the law school professor ―typically 
avoids explicit discussion of values in order to avoid ‗preaching‘ or ‗indoc-
trination.‘‖37  Judging by last year‘s report on legal education issued by the 
Carnegie Foundation for Advancement of Teaching, not much has changed 
in recent years.38  After visiting law schools across the country, researchers 
concluded that ―in the minds of many faculty, ethical and social values are 
subjective and indeterminate, and, for that reason, can potentially even con-
flict with the all-important values of the academy.‖39  In fact, the view that 
―it is indoctrination even to ask students to articulate their own normative 
positions was surprisingly prevalent‖ in law schools.40   
But the law school classroom as a morality-free zone is more likely to 
be confusing than clarifying.  The report‘s authors observe that when first-
year law students express ―confusions about moral and legal obligations,‖ 
course instructors frequently ―tell them that their concerns about fairness or 
other moral issues are not relevant to legal analysis[,] and [they ask their 
students] to set aside those concerns.‖41  Not only does this ―provid[e] a dis-
torted understanding of the nature of law itself,‖42 but many students find 
their professors‘ reactions to be ―bewildering rather than clarifying.‖43  In-
stead, the report‘s authors suggest that the instructor could: 
 
[Introduce] a careful discussion of the distinction and rela-
tionship between the moral and the legal, illustrate[] some-
thing of the breadth of law‘s concerns, [and thus] deepen 
students‘ understanding of the law [on] both the particular 
legal issues in the case under consideration and the law as a 
social institution.44 
 
Our current practice of professional formation—both in and beyond 
law school—inculcates powerful moral values that emanate from the adver-
sarial system but also, by omitting other moral questions, sends a strong 
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prospect of raising moral considerations with the client tends to be dis-
missed as subversive of the systemic moral values (client autonomy, access 
to the law) that are inculcated.  Current professional education‘s pervasive 
inattention to the moral dimension of legal advice calls into question law-
yers‘ competence to raise such considerations in a way that expands the 
client‘s understanding.46 
Recognizing the institutional complicity in the cultivation of morally 
disengaged lawyers helps to frame a response that is more specific and 
hopeful than Hatfield‘s call to pay greater attention to our moral squea-
mishness.  Moral engagement between lawyer and client is not captured in 
any single question, much less a question as cut-and-dried as, ―Does this 
client want to do something that I personally would not do?‖  Moral en-
gagement requires, at base, a willingness and capacity to talk about the 
moral claims embedded in both the client‘s objectives and the lawyer‘s ad-
vice, as well as the case‘s implications for the common good and the 
client‘s (and, as appropriate, the lawyer‘s) moral integrity.  Figuring out 
how to facilitate both the lawyer‘s willingness and capacity entails recalling 
the answer to the timeless question: ―How do I get to Carnegie Hall?‖  
Practice, practice, practice.47 
Giving law students the opportunity to practice moral engagement 
within the role of lawyer is not hard to do.  I teach a first-year required 
course designed to introduce students to essential components of moral 
analysis from a variety of religious and philosophical perspectives, and to 
help them trace how those components relate to our understanding of law.  
We begin with Buck v. Bell, the 1927 case in which the Supreme Court 
upheld a state statute permitting involuntary sterilization of institutionalized 
persons and Oliver Wendell Holmes infamously asserted that ―three genera-
tions of imbeciles are enough.‖48  Virtually every student recoils from the 
Court‘s reasoning, but they cannot readily articulate their ―squeamishness.‖  
To ensure that the students have substantive concepts to buttress their intui-
tion, we read excerpts on human dignity from Pope John Paul II, the Tal-
mud, John Stuart Mill, Immanuel Kant, the United Nations, Peter Singer, 
and Friedrich Nietzsche.  The hope is that students will be able to express 
their moral intuitions in language that is accessible to others.  The class fol-
lows a similar format for concepts such as economic justice, the social or-
der, the role of the state, and truth and pluralism.  We also spend time in the 
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the specific dialogue between attorney and client.  We use case studies like 
Enron to talk about the relationship between rights and responsibilities, and 
how that relationship should shape the lawyer‘s role.  Small-group exercis-
es, role-playing, and reflective essays give students an opportunity to use 
their moral intuition as a starting point for conversation, not as a self-
contained ―black box‖ that simply dictates what they can and cannot do as 
lawyers.  
VI. WHAT IS OUR AIM? 
Professionalizing moral engagement is not aimed at producing lawyers 
who are skilled at persuading clients to conform to the lawyer‘s own moral 
worldview; the objective is to produce lawyers who are capable of raising 
the moral considerations embedded in a representation in a way that can ac-
tually enhance client autonomy.  Most lawyers are not advising the White 
House about torture, but moral considerations may implicitly shape the ad-
vice they give in a variety of routine scenarios.  When a lawyer has to ad-
vise whether a home seller must return a down payment to a purchaser who 
cannot proceed with the transaction because he was laid off, or advise a 
company whether to close a plant in a small town that is economically de-
pendent on the company for jobs, or draft a will for a client who is es-
tranged from her children, or engage in plea bargain negotiations, or help 
navigate a custody dispute, or interpret a litigation opponent‘s request for 
sensitive documents, there is an opportunity for moral engagement.   
To be clear, these considerations are not created by the morally en-
gaged attorney; they are simply acknowledged by the morally engaged at-
torney.  In cases where the law is indeterminate, lawyers may allow, 
consciously or not, the moral convictions they hold to shape the advice they 
give.  Even in cases where the law is clear, the inaccessibility of legal 
knowledge permits lawyers to cloud the legal/moral distinction without de-
tection by their clients, leaving the client vulnerable to the lawyer‘s moral 
convictions.  One way to counter this threat of moral paternalism is to en-
courage lawyers to bring the moral dimension of legal matters into the 
open, unpacking relevant moral considerations for the client‘s own deci-
sionmaking.  John Yoo failed to do that.  His failure should not, however, 
be read as an indictment of lawyers‘ moral deference.  Hatfield is correct 
that moral deference is ubiquitous among today‘s lawyers, but he is wrong 
to identify deference as an affliction; it is an important part of a client-
centered profession.  Moral engagement also plays an important role in a 
client-centered profession, particularly one that has such wide-ranging mor-
al implications for the client, the lawyer, and the common good.  Unfortu-
nately, the morally engaged lawyer is far too rare.  Professionalizing moral 
engagement may not put an end to the sort of base moral reasoning that 
drove John Yoo‘s analysis of torture, but it will make it harder to hide that 
moral reasoning under the cover of law. 
